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SUMMARY The stream cipher Sprout with a short internal state was
proposed in FSE 2015. Although the construction guaranteed resistance to
generic Time Memory Data Tradeoﬀ attacks, there were some weaknesses
in the design and the cipherwas completely broken. In this paperwe propose
a family of stream ciphers LILLE in which the size of the internal state is half
the size of the secret key. Our main goal is to develop robust lightweight
stream cipher. To achieve it, our cipher based on the two-key EvenMansour
construction and thus its security against key/state recovery attacks reduces
to a well analyzed problem. We also prove that like Sprout, the construction
is resistant to generic Time Memory Data Tradeoﬀ attacks. Unlike Sprout,
the construction of the cipher guarantees that there are no weak key-IV
pairs which produce a keystream sequence with short period or which make
the algebraic structure of the cipher weaker and easy to cryptanalyze. The
reference implementations of all members of the LILLE family with standard
cell libraries based on the STM 90nm and 65 nm processes were also found
to be smaller thanGrain v1while security of LILLE family depend on reliable
problem in the symmetric cryptography.
key words: Even-Mansour, lightweight, stream cipher, short internal state,
TMD tradeoﬀ.
1. Introduction
1.1 Background
In the past few years, lightweight cryptography has become a
very active research field, with a large deployment of network
devices requiring security including resource-constrained
devices such as sensor nodes and RFID tags. As a result, we
have seen a number of candidates of lightweight primitives,
e.g. block ciphers: PRESENT [14], KATAN [17], LED [28],
Piccolo [44], TWINE [45], Midori [5], and PRINCE [15].
In any lightweight implementation, the register size con-
sumes the most significant percentage of the total area. A
stream cipher requires an internal state twice the size of the
keylength to prevent the Biryukov-Shamir Time-Memory-
Data Tradeoﬀ attack [13]. This is one of the reasons why
block ciphers are common in the lightweight cryptography
world. However, due to the birthday limitation, it is unde-
sirable to encrypt data of more than 232 blocks (around few
Gigabytes), with a key and IV pair in the CBC mode and
a key in the counter mode. It is an undesirable property in
real-world applications. On the other hand, a stream cipher
does not have such a birthday limitation.
At FSE 2015, Armknecht and Mikhalev showed that
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even with a state smaller than twice the keylength, one can
avoid the Biryukov-Shamir TMD attack. This was done by
inserting some key information into the keystreamgeneration
function [1]. As an example, a stream cipher called Sprout
was presented. Unfortunately, a lot of attacks immediately
broke this construction. A state recovery attack based on a
guess and determine attack was first proposed in [39]. This
attack was faster than exhaustive search by a factor of about
210 and had amemory complexity of 246 bits. In [26], a TMD
tradeoﬀ attack was outlined using an online time complexity
of 233 encryptions and 770 TB of memory. The paper first
observed that it was easy to deduce the secret key from the
knowledge of the internal state and the keystream. The paper
thenmade an observation on special states of Sprout that pro-
duced keystream without the involvement of the secret key.
The pre-computation stage outlined a method to generate
and store such states in tables. The online stage consisted of
inspecting keystream bits, retrieving the corresponding state
from the table, assuming of course that the state in question
was a special state, and then computing the secret key. The
process, if repeated a certain number of times, guaranteed
that a special state would be encountered, from where the
correct secret key was found. In [3], the author used a slide
attack technique to distinguish the keystream produced by a
single key and multiple randomly chosen IVs. The attack
required 240 keystream sequences and a memory of around
248 bits. In the same paper the author showed that there were
around 270 key-IV pairs in Sprout that produced keystream
of period 80. Furthermore, the author showed that for every
key there existed around 230 IVs for which the linear reg-
ister used in Sprout became all zero after the key-IV setup
phase. This weakened the algebraic structure of the cipher
considerably and the author was able to perform a state re-
covery attack in the multiple IV setting using time equivalent
to 266:7 encryptions and negligible memory. Another TMD
tradeoﬀ attack using the normality of the output function
was presented in [47]. Another state recovery attack using
the Fibonacci to Galois transformation of shift registers was
proposed in [40].
1.2 Motivation and Design Goal
After Sprout was broken, a very relevant question remained
whether it was possible to construct ciphers with short in-
ternal states. Furthermore, another question was whether it
was possible to guarantee the security of such ciphers against
generic attacks. In this respect, a very natural tradeoﬀ is be-
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tween throughput and area. Shorter internal state usually
implies that an attacker has to spend lesser eﬀort in order to
cryptanalyze the cipher via a state recovery attack. On the
other hand, lower throughput implies that lesser informa-
tion is made available to the attacker to perform any kind of
cryptanalysis. It seems only natural that a cipher with shorter
internal state, must in some sense compensate by lowering
its throughput, in order to maintain the security margins.
Such ciphers with small states are particularly useful in con-
strained environments like RFID tags where the major opti-
mization thrust goes into lowering the area and power, even
at the expense of throughput. Our second motivation was
to find a lightweight solution for encrypting long messages.
Most lightweight block ciphers have a blocksize of 64 bits,
and due to the birthday constraint they cannot encrypt mes-
sages longer than 232 blocks. Basically, IoT applications
which do not require real-time operations between edge de-
vices and a cloud server are our target. In this case, the edge
device does sensing the environment including temperature,
the pulse, locations, or records picture/movie information of
surveillance camera, and send it to cloud server at fixed time,
and the server gathers information from these from devices
and analyzes it. In these applications, since a real-time pro-
cessing is not required, throughput is not problem. It is a
common use case of IoT.
The challenge therefore is to find a reliable lightweight
stream cipher construction, secure against both generic and
recently proposed attacks, while keeping the small state size
requirement, and deliver a solution for encrypting a long
message beyond 232 blocks to lightweight cryptographyfield.
Therefore, the design goals of the target stream cipher with
respect to security and implementation targets are as follows.
Security
• Security against key and state recovery attacks that re-
duces to the security of a well-analyzed problem.
• Demonstrable security against all published Time-
Memory-Data Tradeoﬀ attacks [13, 25, 33].
• Guarantee a long period beyond 232 blocks.
Implementation
• Smallest among secure stream ciphers with respect to
the area, even if it requires lowering of throughput.
1.3 Our Contribution
In this paper we propose a family of stream ciphers LILLE,
that has the smallest area among all secure stream ciphers
oﬀering 80 bit security. The cipher is based on the well
known two-key Even Mansour construction. The design is
put together in such amanner that noweak key-IV pairs exist,
and given any key-IV pair we can guarantee a minimum
period for the keystream produced by it. We demonstrate
security of the cipher against a number of popular attack
paradigms. Finally we present implementation results for the
family of ciphers in ASIC using the standard cell libraries
based on the STM65nmand 90nm logic processes. Weprove
that all the three versions of the cipher occupy lesser area than
80-bit stream ciphers like Grain v1 [31] and Trivium [19].
1.4 Related work
1.4.1 Comparison with other lightweight stream ciphers:
Comparingwith other stream ciphers oﬀering 80 bit security,
all the members of the LILLE family are smaller than Grain
v1 and Trivium. In fact the size of all the members of this
family are at least 1.5 times less than Trivium. It is slightly
larger than Sprout, but since the cipher has been broken, we
do not consider a direct comparison with it. For both Grain
v1 and Sprout there exist a class of weak key-IV pairs [3,48]
that lead the LFSR in the design to the all zero state after
the Key-IV setup phase. This not only causes the ciphers
to produce keystream of lower period, but it also weakens
their algebraic structure. In Sprout, this leads to a state
recovery attack [3] in time equivalent to 266:7 encryptions.
In Grain v1, this leads to a distinguishing attack using 244:2
keystream bits [48]. In LILLE, these drawbacks are absent
due to the fact that the LFSR is initialized with a constant
state that never enters the degenerate all zero state. Thus
not only does the cipher guarantee a minimum period for the
keystream sequence, there are also no weak key-IV pairs that
weakens the algebraic structure of the cipher.
Very recently two lightweight stream ciphers: Lizard
[29] and Plantlet [41] have been proposed. Plantlet suﬀers
from the same distinguishing attack proposed in [3] in con-
text of the stream cipher Sprout, and the authors of Plantlet
admit this in [41, Section 5]. The authors of Lizard stipulate
that nomore than 218 bits of keystream can be generated from
a single Key-IV pair. This is not desirable for applications
that need to encrypt large data streams. Furthermore, Lizard
suﬀers from IV collision issues: it is possible to find a key
for which there exist two diﬀerent IVs which produce iden-
tical keystream segments. The authors of Lizard admit that
such an IV collision can be found in 260:5 queries. The au-
thors also show a TMD Tradeoﬀ Distinguisher that requires
243 random IV queries. Lastly, it is also possible to find
two diﬀerent Key-IV pairs that generate the same keystream
segment in only about 228 queries. LILLE is free from such
issues.
1.4.2 Comparison with block ciphers in CBC and counter
mode:
Our construction looks like a combination of CBCmode and
counter mode of block ciphers. As mentioned before, due
to the birthday limitation, it is undesirable to encrypt data of
more than 232 blocks using 64-bit block cipher. On the other
hand, our construction guarantees long message encryption
by properly choosing the size of LFSR. Furthermore, the
counter mode additionally requires the cost of a counter in
addition to the area of the block cipher. Thus, we compare
the gate size of our stream cipher with a lightweight block
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cipher including a counter of appropriate length.
Due to birthday limitations, we can not encrypt more
than 2N=2 blocks with a block cipher of blocksize N us-
ing conventional modes of operations like CBC and counter
mode. Thus the maximum data an N bit block cipher can
encrypt is N2N=2. For N = 64, this is only around 238 bits,
so for larger dataset encryption we should make a compar-
ison with ciphers with blocksize 96 or 128. Furthermore,
the counter mode would require either a decimal counter or
LFSR of N=2 bits. The cost of a 64-bit LFSR is estimated
at around 300 GE (GE or gate equivalents is the area occu-
pied by an equivalent number of 2-input NAND gates). The
hardware cost of serialized implementations of well-known
128-bit block ciphers is around 2060 GE (AES 128), 1234
GE (Simon 128/128), 1280 GE (Speck 128/128) [4, 9]. Of
block ciphers with 96 bit block size we have 955 GE (Simon
96/96), 1012 GE (Speck 96/96). As we will further see in
Section 5.3, our construction is suﬃciently smaller than the
block cipher with counter modes.
There is no straightforward method to make a coma-
parison with the CBC mode of block ciphers. To implement
any block cipher in any particular mode of operation like
CBC would require some overhead (typically around 50 GE
or more/less) and it depends on the particular architecture
of the cipher in question. We can only remark that our con-
struction is less in area than the core circuit of the 96/128 bit
block cipher required to encrypt an equal amount of data.
2. Specification
The LILLE stream cipher has an 80 bit Secret Key and an
80 bit IV y. The most significant and least significant 40
bits of the Secret Key are denoted as K1 and K2 respec-
tively. The cipher has a 40 bit internal state register and an
` bit Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) of maximum
period. We specify three variants of the cipher LILLE-40,
LILLE-60 and LILLE-80 for which ` = 40; 60; 80 respec-
tively. The principal module in the LILLE stream cipher fam-
ily is the ENCK1;K2;IV;Lr () module that is a permutation on
f0; 1g40 ! f0; 1g40. The function is indexed by K1; K2; IV
and Lr the current ` bit state of the LFSR.
In LILLE-40, the LFSR is initialized to the 40-bit
state L0 =0x0000000001. For LILLE-60, LILLE-80,
the initial values are 0x000000000000001 and 0x0000
0000000000000001 respectively. The state is initialized
to the 40-bit all zero vector. The keystream is produced due
to the following rule (the process is described in Figure 1):
1. r = 0, IV = IV j0x0000000000 (zero padded to 120
bits).
2. L0 =
8>><>>:
0x0000000001; for LILLE-40;
0x000000000000001; for LILLE-60;
0x00000000000000000001; for LILLE-80:
3. Z0 =0x0000000000.
4. While Keystream is required
yAlthough we use the term IV (Initial Vector) to denote this
vector, it is used throughout in the encryption phases.
ENC ENC ENC
0
Z0 Z1 Z2
K1 K2 K1 K2 K1 K2
IV IV IVC0 C1 C2
Fig. 1 Description of the LILLE family of stream ciphers.
Note that Cr = L720r; i.e. the 720r th LFSR state.
 Zr+1 = ENCK1;K2;IV;L720r (Zr )
 r  r + 1
The successive 40 bit output values of the ENC module
Z1; Z2; Z3 : : : form the keystream sequence. The structure of
the ENC module is given in Figure 2. We also provide a
pseudocode as follows:
ENCK1;K2;IV;Lr (X )
1. X = X  K1.
2. For i = 0 to 5
 If i is even RK = K2 else RK = K1.
 X = P(X; IV; Lr+120i)  RK
3. Output X .
The module essentially alternates addition of K1; K2 to
the current state in between the application of 6 instances of
the permutation P. As we will see shortly, the permutation
P takes as input the IV , and the current LFSR state Lr , the
initial 40 bit state S0 and outputs the 40 bit state S120 after
120 iterations. The permutation P and the LFSR are both
implemented as shift registers. The functional description of
the Permutation P is given as follows (note that X[u] denotes
the uth bit of X , and j j denotes the concatenation operation):
P(S0; IV; Lr )
1. For t = 0 to 119
yt = St [0]  St [5]  St [8]  St [12]  St [16]  St [19]  St [22]
St [26]  St [29]  St [31]  St [32]  St [32]  St [35]
St [19]  St [22]  St [5]  St [9]  St [26]  St [31]  St [32]
St [12]  St [16]  St [19]  St [5]  St [16]  St [26]  St [35]
St [19]  St [22]  St [31]  St [32]  St [9]  St [12]  St [32]
St [35]  St [22]  St [26]  St [31]  St [32]  St [35]
St [5]  St [9]  St [12]  St [16]  St [19]  St [12]  St [16]
 St [19]  St [22]  St [26]  St [31]  IV [t]  Lr+t [0]
St+1 = St [1] j j St [2] j j    j j St [39] j j yt
2. Output S120.
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In addition, the permutation P uses Lr+t [0] which is the 0th
bit of the updated LFSR state Lr+t in each iteration. The
LFSR state is updated in iteration (for all t  0) as follows:
lt =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
Lr+t [0]  Lr+t [5]  Lr+t [15]  Lr+t [20]
Lr+t [25]  Lr+t [34]; for LILLE-40;
Lr+t [0]  Lr+t [8]  Lr+t [17]  Lr+t [28]
Lr+t [35]  Lr+t [41]; for LILLE-60;
Lr+t [0]  Lr+t [13]  Lr+t [23]  Lr+t [38]
Lr+t [51]  Lr+t [62]; for LILLE-80:
Lr+t+1 =
8>><>>:
Lr+t [1] j j    j j Lr+t [39] j j lt; for LILLE-40;
Lr+t [1] j j    j j Lr+t [59] j j lt; for LILLE-60;
Lr+t [1] j j    j j Lr+t [79] j j lt; for LILLE-80:
Since each permutation is computed in 120 clock cycles, the
ENC module takes 720 rounds to compute. Also note that
as given in Figure 2, the input LFSR states to the successive
instances of P are Lr; Lr+120; : : :.
3. Design Decision
We explain our design decisions vis-a-vis the design goals
of Section 1.
3.1 Generic Construction:
• ENCK1;K2;IV;Lr () is regarded as a 6-round iterated
Even-Mansour with two alternating keys [27] for a
fixed IV. The LILLE stream cipher produces a 40-bit
keystream after a call of ENCK1;K2;IV;Lr (). This sit-
uation corresponds to the known plaintext setting in a
block cipher. Thus, we can claim that the securities of
key/state recovery attacks reduces to a 6-round iterated
Even-Mansour with two alternating keys in the known
plaintext setting.
• The basic component of the stream cipher is the
ENCK1;K2;IV;Lr () module which changes depending
on the current LFSR state for a Key and IV. The cipher
can guarantee a minimum period for the keystream due
to the size of LFSR. As we will see shortly, a larger
LFSR guarantees a larger period for the keystream se-
quence produced by the cipher. Hence, depending on
user requirements, one can choose the LFSR as per the
required period of a keystream.
• The internal permutation ENCK1;K2;IV;Lr () takes both
key and IV as inputs. This prevents generic TMD trade-
oﬀ attacks. We will describe the details in the next
section.
3.2 Underlying Permutation:
The update function used in LILLE, is the same as the func-
tion f used in the hash function QUARK [2]. The function
is of 13 variables, has a non-linearity of 3440, and algebraic
degree 6, and is 3-resilient. One of the reasons that a func-
tion of high algebraic degree was chosen, was to thwart any
algebraic advance via chosen IV attacks like cube attacks,
dynamic cube attacks and conditional diﬀerential attacks. It
is expected that after the 720 rounds of the ENC module
the algebraic degree of the output bits would be close to 80.
The function is surprisingly lightweight and occupies only
around 52 GE using the standard cell library based on the
STM 90nm process.
4. Security Analysis
We analyze the security of the LILLE stream cipher
with respect to several attacks. First, we evaluate the
generic construction assuming the underlying function
ENCK1;K2;IV;Lr () is a pseudo random function. Then, we
evaluate the the underlying function ENCK1;K2;IV;Lr ().
4.1 General Construction
4.1.1 Key/State recovery attacks
Despite considerable cryptanalytic eﬀorts over past twenty
years, there is no eﬃcient generic attacks on the more
than 5-round iterated Even-Mansour with two alternating
keys [23,24,34,42]. However, asmentioned in [24], there are
polynomial-time advantage attacks on up to 8-round which
improve over exhaustive search by a relatively-small fac-
tor [23]. If the user would like to also avoid this type of the
attack, he has only to use a 10-round iterated Even-Mansour
with two alternating keys as ENCK1;K2;IV;Lr (). Importantly,
even if increasing the number of rounds, the additional cost
is negligible.
Next, let us consider a multiple IV attack where the
adversary is able to get keystream bits generated by dif-
ferent IVs. If the IV is diﬀerent, an internal permutation
ENCK1;K2;IV;Lr () become a distinct one. Thus, in this case,
the adversary has to attack diﬀerent block ciphers at the same
time, i.e. diﬀerent 6-round iterated Even-Mansour with two
alternating keys. Therefore, even in this case, there is no
advantage over the single IV case.
4.1.2 Distinguishing attacks:
ENCK1;K2;IV;Lr () takes diﬀerent round constants from
LFSR. Thus each of ENCK1;K2;IV;Lr () is assumed to be
independent PRP for a fixed Key-IV pair. Assuming that the
input of each ENCK1;K2;IV;Lr () is uniformly-distributed, a
keystream block can be regarded as a pseudo random string.
4.1.3 Key and IV collision attack:
If either the key or IV has a diﬀerence , then the same
diﬀerence  is inserted into all ENCK1;K2;IV;Lr () modules.
Here, each of ENCK1;K2;IV;Lr () is a independent function
due to round constants. The probability that same diﬀerences
are canceled out inside of all ENCK1;K2;IV;Lr () at the same
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K1 K1 K1 K1K2 K2 K2
P P P P P P
IV, Lr IV, Lr+120 IV, Lr+240 IV, Lr+360 IV, Lr+480 IV, Lr+600
ENCK1,K2,IV,Lr(·)
Fig. 2 Description of the ENCK1;K2;IV;Lr () function
time is extremely low.
4.1.4 TMD TradeOﬀ attacks
We will demonstrate that the LILLE stream cipher is secure
against generic TimeMemory Data (TMD) Tradeoﬀ attacks.
To do so let us recall three generic TMD attacks present in
literature.
1. Biryukov-Shamir Attack [13] TMD tradeoﬀ attacks
aim to invert a one way function f at a single point in the
range of function. The attack is probabilistic and the attacker
may need access to to multiple points in the range of f . For
stream ciphers, the one way function is typically the map be-
tween the internal state and the prefix of the keystream bits
produced by the internal state. The attack outlined in [13]
can be described thus:
a. Let N denote the size of the set of internal states. The
attacker chooses m; t; D so that mt2 = N and t  D.
b. The attacker builds tD tables of size m t in the following
manner: he randomly chooses m initial states. For each
initial state, he forms a chain of length t by iteratively
applying the stream cipher function f and using the
keystream as the state for the next point. For each table
some unique reordering of the bits after applying the
function f is used so that the tables do not store the
same set of states.
c. In the process, mt  tD = ND of the state space is covered by
all the chains. This also happens to be the oﬄine com-
plexity of this stage. Also only the start and endpoints
of each chain are stored in tables, and so M = m  tD
bits of memory is used.
d. In the online phase, the attacker has access to D segments
of keystream. For each target keystream segment y , he
applies f on y upto t times checks if y is present as an
endpoint in any table. If yes, he goes back to the starting
point and retrieves the state just before y in the chain.
The total time complexity is thus T = D  t  tD = t2.
This gives us the tradeoﬀ curve TM2D2 = N2, with the
limitation that T  D2.
We claim that the above attack can not be applied on LILLE.
First note that without the key, IV and current LFSR state
a function can not map the internal state to the keystream.
Hence the eﬀective internal state of the cipher consists of
not only the 40 bit internal state, but also the 80 bit secret
key, 80 bit IV and the `-bit LFSR state. Therefore, the ef-
fective value of N = 240+80+80+` = 2200+` . This value is
larger than 2240 for all three versions of LILLE. Considering
the tradeoﬀ curve TM2D2 = N2, and the oﬄine complex-
ityP = ND it is impossible to have bothP andT less than 280.
2. Hong-Sarkar Attack [33] This attack is exactly the same
as the Biryukov-Shamir attack, except that the definition of
the underlying one way function is now changed. In this
attack f maps the string consisting of the Key and IV to an
equal length keystream bits. Thus if K andV refer to the size
of the Key space and IV space respectively, then N = KV ,
and we will have the new tradeoﬀ curve TM2D2 = K2V 2
with the limitation that T  D2. This attack becomes appli-
cable if V << K , as in the case of the A5/3 cipher (in which
the size of the secret key in 64 bits, and the size of the IV
is 22 bits). In our case K = V , and N = KV = 2160, and
so as per the analysis presented in [35, Proposition 1] so this
attack is again not feasible.
3. Dunkelman-Keller Attack [25] The Dunkelman-Keller
TMD attack is a multiple IV attack, i.e. the attacker obtains
keystream bits from multiple IVs and the same Key in order
to perform the attack. The definition of the underlying one
way function f is slightly diﬀerent from the Hong-Sarkar
attack. Given a fixed IV, the function f maps the secret
key to the keystream sequence of equal length. The attacker
chooses VD random IVs. For each IV he constructs t tables
as before, by iterative application of the function f from
m random starting points, with mt2 = K . Again only the
start and end points are stored and so for each IV the storage
required is Msingle = mt, and the total storage is therefore
Msingle  VD , and the total oﬄine complexity P = K  VD .
In the online phase, the attacker waits until he receives
keystream for one of the VD IVs he had made tables for.
This happens in roughly D IV resynchronizations. Once
he gets such keystream from such an IV, he retrieves the
t tables he had constructed for the particular IV and tries
to find the inverse image of the keystream string in each
of the tables. Therefore the online complexity is given by
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T = D + t2 = D + K
2
M2
single
= D + K
2V 2
M2D2
with the constraints
T  D;V  D. In the case of LILLE, KV = 2160 and again
as per the analysis presented in [35, Proposition 1] so this
attack is not feasible.
4. Esgin-Kara Attack [26] This attack is specific to the
Sprout stream cipher. The authors take advantage of the non-
linear key mixing in Sprout to enumerate a special class of
internal states which produce keystream for around 40 cycles
without any contribution from the secret key. All such states
along with the produced keystream bits are listed in tables.
The online stage consists of inspecting keystream bits, re-
trieving the corresponding state from the table, assuming of
course that the state in question is a special state, and then
computing the secret key. The process, if repeated a certain
number of times, guarantees that a special state is encoun-
tered, from where the correct secret key is found. LILLE is
immune from this style of attack primarily because it does
not employ non-linear key mixing.
5. Zhang-Gong Attack [47] This attack is again specific to
the Sprout stream cipher, and somewhat similar in structure
to the Esgin-Kara attack, in somuch that it takes advantage of
the non-linear key mixing in Sprout to find special states that
produce keystream without directly involving the secret key.
The attack additionally uses a property of Boolean functions
called k-normality. A function is called k-normal if it is con-
stant over a k-dimensional subspace of its input variables.
Using the normality of the output function used in Sprout,
the attack further refines the definition of special states to
mean those for which the output function is evaluated in the
k-dimensional space for a given number of rounds, which
are again listed in tables. Using this technique the TMD
tradeoﬀ attack they propose is around 210 times faster than
the Esgin-Kara attack. Again, since LILLE does not use non-
linear mixing, this attack is not applicable.
4.1.5 Period:
In [3], it was shown that there are around 270 Key-IV pairs in
Sprout that produces keystream of period 80. Furthermore it
was shown that for each key, there exists around 230 IVs that
lead to the LFSR being all zero during the keystream gener-
ating phase, for which keystream of period less than 80  240
is produced. However in LILLEwe can guarantee a minimum
period for the Keystream sequence produced by any Key-IV
pair. The basic unit of the cipher is the ENCK1;K2;IV;Lr
module which behaves as a random permutation. The per-
mutation depends on the current LFSR state. Since we use
a maximum length LFSR for all three versions of the ci-
pher, the ENC module will take any given LFSR state Lr
as input only after LCM(2`   1; 720) = 48  (2`   1) itera-
tions for LILLE-40, LILLE-80 and 16  (2`   1) iterations for
LILLE 60. Since the ENC permutations themselves repeat
after 48  (2`  1) iterations (for LILLE-40, LILLE-80), we can
guarantee that the period of the keystream sequence for any
key, IV pair is some integer multiple of 40  48  (2`   1).
For LILLE-60 this figure is 40  16  (2`   1). This comes to
around 250:9; 269:3; 290:9 for LILLE-40, LILLE-60 and LILLE-
80 respectively.
4.2 Underlying Function
4.2.1 Diﬀerential Attack:
The only way to insert a diﬀerence in the internal state is via
the initial vector. A look at the structure of LILLE tells us
that the best way to insert a diﬀerence is via the 80th IV bit.
In this case a diﬀerence gets inserted in the 80th round of the
ENC module. The resulting diﬀerence between states can
be distinguished after 73 rounds, using around 220 samples.
We have
Pr[S153[0]  S0153[0] = 0] 
1
2
  2 9;
where S153 and S0153 denote the two 153
rd round states ini-
tialized by a diﬀerence in the 80th IV bit. The best possible
diﬀerential attack we could find is on 153 rounds of the
ENC module. This in turn means that the permutation P
can be distinguished upto 73 of the 120 rounds using such a
technique.
4.2.2 Linear Approximations:
In [12], it was shown that in Grain like constructions a linear
approximation of some bias exists between a linear sum of
the keystream bits and a linear sum of some of the LFSR bits.
Using this approximation, the authors were able to apply a
variant of the Fast Walsh transform to deduce the entire
LFSR state of Grain v0. The authors of Grain identified this
weakness and tweaked the keystream producing function in
Grain v1 in a manner so that the above linear approximation
held with much lower bias, which made a state recovery
attack infeasible. In LILLE the keystream is produced by
directly xoring the state with one half of the secret key.
So any equation for linear approximation that utilizes the
linear approximation of the update function in LILLE must
also contain the unknown secret key. This makes any linear
attack of the type described in [12] infeasible.
Furthermore the update function is 3-resilient which
means that the aﬃne approximation with least number of
linear terms has a correlation coeﬃcient of 3  2 8. Omitting
the publicly known IV and LFSR contributions to the update
function, the best linear approximation for 80 out of the 120
rounds of the permutation P with the highest correlation
coeﬃcient we could find was
x80 = x0 + x7 + x15 + x16 + x18 + x26 + x36;
where x0; x1; : : : x39 and x0; x1; : : : x39 and x80; x81; : : : x119
are the input and output 40 bits for P reduced to 80 rounds.
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The approximation has a correlation coeﬃcient of 36 2 48 
2 38:5, which can not be distinguished in less than 240.
4.2.3 Conditional Diﬀerential Cryptanalysis:
The notion of Conditional Diﬀerential Cryptanalysis was
first proposed byBen-Aroya/Biham to attack Lucifer [10,11].
Knellwolf et al. in [37] used it attack reduced round versions
of the Grain stream cipher. This attack paradigm is closely
related to Cube andDynamic Cube attacks [20,21] andAlge-
braic IV Diﬀerential Attacks [46]. Conditional Diﬀerential
Cryptanalysis has been used to cryptanalyze reduced round
versions of the Grain family [36,37], the stream cipher Triv-
ium and the block cipher KATAN [38]. In a typical attack
scenario, the attacker introduces some diﬀerence via a public
variable like the IV/plaintext into the underlying cryptosys-
tem and tries to construct a distinguisher that depends on the
values of one or more Secret Key bits used in the system.
The distinguisher is constructed in such a manner that the
attacker is able to distinguish the output of the cryptosystem
from an ideally distributed random variable if and only if
he guesses the values of certain Secret Key bits/expressions
correctly.
In LILLE the attacker, as before, introduces a diﬀerence
in the 80th IV bit. At rounds t = 84; 87; 88 the diﬀerence
sits on the locations 35; 32; 31 of the state register. These
locations also happen to provide inputs to the update func-
tion of the state register. The attacker tries to prevent the
propagation of the diﬀerential through the feedback function
in these rounds by invoking certain algebraic conditions at
these rounds. These typically involve assigning to 0 or 1 a
function involving a secret key bit and some non linear func-
tion of the IV. A total of 8 such assignments are required.
Thereafter as in [36], the IV space is divided into 28 non
intersecting subsets so that all the 8 conditions are satisfied
in only one these sets. If all the algebraic conditions are sat-
isfied we have a bias in the 155th round (which is observed
in only one of the 28 subsets):
Pr[S155[0]  S0155[0] = 0] 
1
2
  2 9
This is the best possible distinguisher we could find for the
permutation that takes less than 230 samples. This again
implies a distinguisher for 75 of the 120 rounds of P.
4.2.4 Cube Attacks:
Cube attackswere first introduced in [22], and have been used
to cryptanalyze full versions of Grain-128 [20,21]. However
we choose an update function of algebraic degree equal to 6
and the high number of rounds in the ENC module lead us
to believe that the algebraic degree of the keystream bits in
the secret key variables is close to 80. Hence we believe that
cube attacks will be infeasible against all versions of LILLE.
4.2.5 Algebraic Attacks:
Algebraic attacks against LFSR-based keystream generators
were introduced in [16]. The authors were able to attack
ciphers like Toyocrypt and LILI-128, by lowering the alge-
braic degree of keystream equations by multiplying them by
suitably chosen annihilator polynomials. These attacks work
best if the algebraic degree of the bank of equations is more
or less constant. But for ciphers like LILLE that are based on
non-linear feedback shift registers, the algebraic degree of
the state variables increase very rapidly and after 720 rounds
of the ENC module, we expect the degree to be close to 80
in the secret key bits. As a result, algebraic attacks seem to
be infeasible against LILLE.
4.2.6 Slide Attacks and Weak Key-IV pairs:
Slide attacks have been reported against Grain v1 in [18] to
speed up exhaustive key search by a factor of 2. These attacks
make use of the similarity of the state update routines in the
Key-IV setup and the keystream generating phases of Grain
v1. However, in LILLE any such attack is clearly defeated
because of the presence of the LFSR which guarantees that
the same version of the ENC permutation can not repeat
before 48  (2` 1) iterations for LILLE 40,80 (and 16  (2` 1)
for LILLE 60). Weak key-IV pairs that land the linear register
in the all zero state after the key-IV setup and thus weaken
the algebraic structure of the cipher has been reported against
Grain v1 [48] and Sprout [3]. However this can not occur in
LILLE because of the presence of the maximum length LFSR
which never attains the all zero state irrespective of the key
and IV used.
Recently, Hamann et al. have proposed a distinguishing
attack on stream ciphers with a small internal state [30]. The
attack exploits a collision of an initial state and a state in key
generation phase. In LILLE, such a collision is never found,
because a state of LFSR is always diﬀerent in each clock.
Thus, their attack is not applicable to LILLE.
4.2.7 Divide and Conquer Attacks:
We consider attacks in which the 40 bit subkey K1 is com-
pletely known. In that event, the system reduces to a 2-round
iterated Even-Mansour structurewith a single key and known
IV. Even in that case, there is no known method to find the
second subkey eﬃciently [24].
4.2.8 Diﬀerential Fault Attack:
Fault attacks on stream ciphers is a well researched topic as
is apparent from numerous papers in literature [7, 8, 32]. If
the attacker is able to apply time and location synchronized
bit flipping faults to either the state register or the LFSR,
he may be able to determine the internal state of the cipher
by comparing the faulty and fault-free keystream bits and
formulating enough equations to solve for the internal state in
the final round of the ENC module. Once the internal state
is found, K1 can be calculated, just by xoring the internal
state with the 40 bit keystream block. However it is not clear
how the attacker can use this method to deduce the value of
8
IEICE TRANS. ??, VOL.Exx–??, NO.xx XXXX 200x
b
State Register
Non-linear Function
LFSR Selector
IV
IV [i]
K1
K2
K1
Add Key
Keystream
K1
Fig. 3 Implementation of the LILLEStream cipher
K2. Notwithstanding, we do not claim security from fault
attacks.
4.2.9 Attack against Lizard:
In [6], the authors outline a number of cryptanalytic results
against Lizard. First, they show that it is possible to get a)
one key K and 2 IVs V0;V1 so that K;V0 and K;V1 produce
the same keystream and b) key-IV pairs K0;V0 and K1;V1 so
that K0;V0 and K1;V1 produce the same keystream. Both the
attacks are possible due to the non-injective nature of the key-
IV mixing function used in Lizard. This is not possible in
LILLE because the key-IV mixing is one to one. Thereafter
the authors propose a slide based distinguishing attack on
Lizard. Slide attacks are not possible on LILLE because of
the LFSR based round constants destroy similarity of the
successive ENC modules.
Finally in [6], an impossible collision attack ismounted
on reduced round Lizard, that gain takes help of IV pairs that
with a given key, produce the same keystream. This is not
possible in LILLE because no such pairs exist.
5. Implementation Results
In Figure 3, we present the circuit for the implementation of
the LILLE stream cipher. The circuit consists of
1. A State Register,
2. A Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR),
3. A logic block named “Non-linear function” that imple-
ments the transformation St ! St+1,
4. A selector that takes the 80 bit IV and filters its ith bit
IV [i] in each round,
5. A multiplexer that filters K1; K2 in respective rounds.
6. A bank of AND gates that helps filter the current round
key only at the last (120th) iteration of the Permutation.
7. Xor gates for key addition, and other control logic.
In the first clock cycle the most significant 40 bits of the
Secret Key K1 is loaded onto the state register, and the state
register is run for 120 cycles for computing the permutation
P. The two halves of the secret key K1 and K2 are filtered
in alternate rounds through a multiplexer and this output is
used as the round key. In the 120th cycle of the permutation,
the “Add Key” signal is set to 1, which filters the current
round key for addition to the state. However, the round
key is not added in the 6th and final permutation of the
ENC cycle. This is because the addition of K1 after the
last permutation of the current ENC operation cancels out
with the addition of K1 before the first permutation round
of the next ENC operationy. In the final round of the final
permutation instance of the ENC operation, the keystream
is made available by xoring K1 with the state.
5.1 Simulation Results
We implemented the three ciphers LILLE-40, LILLE-60 and
LILLE-80 using the standard cell libraries based on the STM
90nm and 65 nm logic process. The following design flow
was adhered to. All the designs were initially implemented
in VHDL and the functional verification was done using
Mentor Graphics ModelSim SE software. The designs were
then synthesized using the Synopsys Design Compiler for the
Standard Cell library of the a) STM 90nm Logic Process:
CORE90GPHVT v 2.1.a. and b) STM 65nm Logic Process:
CORE65LPSVT v 5.1 The switching activity file was then
generated by performing a timing simulation on the synthe-
sized netlist using the Synopsys VCS Software. The power
was then estimated with the Synopsys Power Compiler by
using the switching activity file. In Table 1, we compare our
implementation results with current state of the art hardware
stream ciphers providing 80-bit security Grain v1, Trivium,
Sprout. The area of the design is provided both in m2 and
Gate Equivalents (GE). Although the sizes of Sprout and
Plantlet are smaller than our construction, we have already
pointed out the security issues in these ciphers in Section 1.4.
As an instructive example, in Figure 4, we present a
break-up of the area shares taken by the various components
of the circuit in the design of LILLE-40 using the standard
cell library of the STM 90nm logic process. As can be seen,
a major part of the circuit area (around 40%) is occupied just
by the registers.
5.2 Discussion
We would like to point out that since the eﬀective internal
state is larger than 40 bits, the design is secure against generic
TMD tradeoﬀ attacks. However the Key and IV state do not
require any additional storage in our construction. And so
we require storage equal to only 40 + ` bits, where ` is the
size of the LFSR. The LFSR state is completely public, and
mainly plays the role of a counter. Therefore the only variable
internal state of the cipher is of 40 bits. Another aspect in
which the design diﬀers from traditional shift registers is the
use of Key and IV. Generally, stream ciphers do not hold
a secret key and an IV after their initialization processes,
whereas LILLE does. However this method is used widely
yThis does not create any security issue as far as we can see.
BANIK et al.: ON DESIGN OF ROBUST LIGHTWEIGHT STREAM CIPHER WITH SHORT INTERNAL STATE
9
STM 90nm STM 65nm Throughput Max Data
# Cipher State Size Area Power (in W ) Area Power (in W ) (Mbps) (Bits)
(in m2) (in GE ) @ 10 MHz (in m2) (in GE ) @ 10 MHz @ 10 MHz
1 Grain v1 160 5072.0 1152.7 47.8 2791.9 1329.5 32.9 -
2 Trivium 288 8229.8 1870.5 78.4 4536.5 2160.2 54.3 10 264
3 Sprout 80 3367.4 765.3 30.2 1833.0 872.8 20.0 -
4 Plantlet 101 3897.6 885.8 35.4 2126.3 1012.5 23.7 -
5 Lizard 121 6516.5 1481.4 51.8 3463.2 1649.0 33.7 218
6 LILLE-40 40 4008.4 911.0 35.0 2137.7 1017.9 22.2 250
7 LILLE-60 40 4363.0 991.6 38.4 2322.8 1106.1 24.7 0.56 269
8 LILLE-80 40 4736.1 1076.4 42.8 2530.8 1205.1 28.2 290
Table 1 Implementation results
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16.8%
Xor Gates
11.4%
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6.1%
Control Logic
15.2%
Multiplexers
5.5%
Non-linear block
4.8%
Counter
4.4%
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Fig. 4 Area shares for LILLE-40 in the STM 90nm logic
process
in block ciphers like LED, Piccolo and Midori and even to
some extent in the stream cipher Sprout. The third aspect
we discuss is the issue of throughput. One can see that, the
LILLE cipher family has considerably lower throughput when
compared to Grain or Trivium, but this is to be expected as
per the arguments outlined in Section 1.2.
5.3 Comparing with CTR mode with variable counter size
Since each of the LILLE versions have been catered to provide
encryption for diﬀerent data lengths, a fairer comparison can
be made with block ciphers that operate in CTR mode with
diﬀerent counter sizes. For example we recommend LILLE-
40 be used for encrypting at most 250 bits using the same key-
IV pair. However due to birthday limitations, the maximum
number of diﬀerent blocks a block cipher of block size of
64 bit can encrypt is 232. Thus we can only employ a 32 bit
counter with a 64 bit block cipher. If we employ a 32 bit IV
and let the counter constitute the remaining 32 bit input to the
block cipher, the maximum number of databits the mode can
encrypt is 64  232 = 238 bits. This is well short of 250. So
any meaningful comparison can only be made with a 96 bit
block cipher which can encrypt upto 96248 = 254:6 bits or a
128 bit block cipher which can encrypt upto 128  264 = 271
bits. A combination of 43 bit counter and 128 bit block
# Cipher Key Block Counter Area (GE) TP (Mbps)
Size @ 10 MHz
For max data = 250 bits
1 LILLE-40 80 - - 911 0.56
2 AES-CTR 128 128 43 2260 5.20
3 Simon-CTR 96 96 44 1155 0.19
4 Speck-CTR 96 96 44 1212 0.18
For max data = 269 bits
1 LILLE-60 80 - - 992 0.56
2 AES-CTR 128 128 62 2360 5.20
3 Simon-CTR 128 128 62 1534 0.14
4 Speck-CTR 128 128 62 1580 0.15
Table 2 Comparison with 64 bit block ciphers with vari-
able counter size, (TP: Throughput)
cipherOR 44 bit counter and 96 bit block cipher can encrypt
250 bits. So for LILLE-60 that can accommodate 269 bits,
we could compare its hardware performance with a 128 bit
block cipher using a 62 bit counter. LILLE-80 can encrypt
290 bits, which can not be reached by any 96 or 128 bit block
cipher in counter mode. In Table 2, we tabulate estimates
for all block ciphers that provide at least 80 bits security. We
choose serialized implementation for all the block ciphers
since they have smaller hardware area. Note that we utilize
the implementations in [4, 9] to arrive at the estimates.
6. Conclusion
Wepropose a family of three streamciphers LILLE-40, LILLE-
60 and LILLE-80. The ciphers are smallest in hardware area
among all other stream ciphers that oﬀer 80 bit security
without any distinguishing or key recovery attacks. The
design is such that there are no weak key-IV pairs and a
minimum period for the keystream sequence is guaranteed.
We also analyzed the security of the cipher against a number
of existing attack paradigms. This makes it an attractive
choice for application in constrained environments and/or in
applications that require encryption of longmessages of over
232 blocks.
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Appendix A: Test Vectors
A. LILLE-40
1.
Key : 00000 00000 00000 00000
IV : 00000 00000 00000 00000
Keystream : 8932b 7cc3e 3a9e7 23520
2.
Key : 51084 ce6e7 3a5ca 2ec87
IV : 687de d3b3c 85b3f 35b10
Keystream : 572b1 c2227 0452c e6301
B. LILLE-60
1.
Key : 00000 00000 00000 00000
IV : 00000 00000 00000 00000
Keystream : 2f81e 66ae9 73452 4b334
2.
Key : 51084 ce6e7 3a5ca 2ec87
IV : 687de d3b3c 85b3f 35b10
Keystream : 4c3ad 0fd80 ffc95 a46ea
C. LILLE-80
1.
Key : 00000 00000 00000 00000
IV : 00000 00000 00000 00000
Keystream : 8517f ffb61 0f062 79e8d
2.
Key : 51084 ce6e7 3a5ca 2ec87
IV : 687de d3b3c 85b3f 35b10
Keystream : cd282 d508c ebb9d d21cc
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